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Investment Treaties, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and 
Inequality: How International Rules and Institutions Can 
Exacerbate Domestic Disparities 
 
 





Over roughly the past four decades, government officials from around the world have been 
erecting a framework of economic governance with major–but under-appreciated–implications 
for intra-national inequality. The components of this framework are thousands of bilateral and 
multilateral treaties designed to protect international investment. In many jurisdictions, the 
treaties have been concluded without public awareness or scrutiny or even much discussion or 
analysis by government officials – including those officials responsible for negotiating the 
agreements (Poulsen 2015) – and without an adequate understanding of how these agreements 
could affect intra-national inequality. Long imperceptible, the size and power of this framework 
for economic governance has increasingly become apparent. And governments continue to 
expand and entrench the framework through the negotiation of several new bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, including the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
Agreement between the European Union and the United States, the agreements China is 
negotiating with the United States and European Union, and the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement being negotiated by sixteen countries throughout Asia 
and the Pacific. 
 
International investment treaties, in short, protect multinational corporations from suffering 
losses due to government actions, or even government failures to act. Corporations that are 
wholly or partly foreign-owned can use investment treaties to sue their “host” governments for 
laws, regulations, court decisions, or other actions the governments take or do not take. 
Companies covered by investment treaties include, for example, the internationally dispersed 
corporate families of oil companies exploring for, extracting, or selling fossil fuels; 
pharmaceutical companies conducting research, manufacturing drugs, holding patents, and/or 
marketing or selling products; companies invested in providing water services; banks making 
investments and providing services; media companies; and any other variety of manufacturing 
and services firms that have established overseas affiliates.  
 
There are various ways in which international investment treaties (often referred to as 
“international investment agreements” or IIAs) providing these protections to multinational 
corporations could impact inequality. In principle, they could potentially reduce inequality. For 
one, a key stated objective of the treaties is to promote cross-border investment by covered firms. 
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Those cross-border investment activities could establish operations and inject capital into areas 
where they are badly needed, spurring economic growth, job creation, and wage increases. To 
the extent that these treaties can catalyze cross-border investment activity, increasing the pay of 
low income workers, or increasing the tax revenue that can be used to redistribute wealth, they 
could help combat intra-national inequality.  
 
Additionally, IIAs could combat intra-national inequality due to a common rule shared by most 
of those 3000 agreements, barring governments from discriminating against foreigners. That rule 
against discrimination could be used by foreign-owned companies to help challenge the nepotism 
and cronyism that elites within a country can use to concentrate market power and wealth within 
their networks (Justino and Moore 2015). IIAs, which give foreign investors and the companies 
they own powerful rights to enforce the treaties’ rules, could be used to unlock opportunities and 
make market participation more equal. 
 
But there are also worrying ways in which IIAs may exacerbate intra-national disparities 
between haves and have-nots in legal, political, and economic terms. Other chapters in this book 
have examined how the investment liberalization rules in IIAs can lead to inequality. But there 
are additional mechanisms through which IIAs can increase intra-national inequality in social, 
economic, legal, and political terms. This chapter focuses on two: the potential for IIAs to 
increase inequality by (1) providing unequal procedural rights for protection of wholly or 
partially foreign-owned firms, providing them greater power than other stakeholders both with 
respect to relations with the host state government, and in connection with disputes with other 
private parties; and (2) providing those foreign firms greater substantive standards of protection 
that strengthen the legal force of their economic rights and “expectations,” with potentially 
negative impacts on competing rights and interests held by others. This chapter provides a sketch 
of each of these two channels, with particular reference to circumstances in the United States.  
Brief Overview of IIAs – Features and Rationale 
 
The substantive protections promised to covered companies in IIAs are broadly consistent across 
the more than 3000 treaties that have been negotiated. The agreements typically  
 
(1) prohibit host states from discriminating against partially or wholly foreign-owned 
companies (which this chapter refers to simply as multinational enterprises or MNEs);  
(2) require host states to provide MNEs “fair and equitable” treatment;  
(3) require governments to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation for MNEs 
or MNEs’ assets that they expropriate; and,  
(4) as other chapters in this book have highlighted, prevent host states from restricting 
MNEs’ abilities to transfer capital in and out of the country.  
 
IIAs also give MNEs powerful rights to sue their host states for alleged violations of treaty 
obligations, and seek compensation for breach. MNEs are able to pursue these claims through 
arbitration before a panel of three private, party-appointed arbitrators. This method of dispute 
settlement, typically referred to as “investor-state dispute settlement” or “ISDS,” is a crucial 
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defining feature of the international investment protection framework discussed in this chapter, 
and strengthens the force of investment protection treaties’ substantive legal provisions.1  
 
One key justification given for concluding these IIAs is that they are needed to protect MNEs 
from disadvantages suffered in host countries due to the MNEs’ foreignness. There are concerns 
that MNEs doing business abroad lack voting power in those jurisdictions, and that foreign-
owned businesses may be discriminated against in favor of locally owned firms. IIAs, it is 
argued, compensate for those vulnerabilities by giving MNEs special protections, which in turn 
may make MNEs more willing to invest their capital abroad. In this sense, IIAs can be seen as 
instruments that level the otherwise unequal playing field between foreign and domestic 
economic actors within a given country, minimizing MNEs’ concerns about discrimination and 
political risk, and facilitating the cross-border capital flows and technology transfers that can be 
so crucial for advancing broad-based sustainable development.  
 
Yet, as this chapter argues, that depiction of IIAs as equalizers needs to be challenged. As an 
initial matter, as arbitral tribunals have interpreted IIAs, actual “foreignness” is not a prerequisite 
to protection. Tribunals have extended IIAs’ protections to firms in the host state that are 
beneficially owned by individuals or enterprises of that host state. In other words, tribunals have 
permitted individuals and firms from Country A to route their investments through holdings 
overseas in Country B, and send them back into Country A as “foreign”-owned firms. Country 
A’s individuals and enterprises with the means and knowledge to do so can adopt this “round-
tripping” strategy in order to benefit from protections offered under IIAs that are more favorable 
than protections otherwise offered to citizens and firms under Country A’s domestic laws.2 
Indeed, the “approach to corporate nationality illustrated by [some ISDS decisions] encourages 
the use of round-tripping structures in developing and emerging markets” (Nougayrède 2015, 
340). While not discussed at length in this chapter, this is “at cross purposes with global 
initiatives in favor of transparency and against corruption, money laundering and tax avoidance” 
(Nougayrède 2015, 340). Those initiatives, which can help combat intra-national inequality, may 
therefore be undermined by IIA rules that provide special treatment for investments made 
through round-tripping. 
 
But even when an MNE is truly foreign owned, there are a number of reasons to question the 
premise that companies wholly or partially owned by foreign individuals or enterprises are 
disadvantaged in the host country and need special protections. First, an MNE may have the 
                                                
1 Under the traditional ISDS mechanism, modeled on international commercial arbitration, arbitrators are appointed 
by the parties and paid by one or both of the disputing parties. This leads, inter alia, to concerns that the arbitrators 
will be loyal to those who appoint them as opposed to being neutral decision makers; it also leads to concerns that 
the arbitrators have a personal interest in seeing a high number of cases, as this will help generate business income 
for them. Exacerbating these concerns is the fact that arbitrators typically operate free from the rules on 
independence and impartiality that typically govern judicial officials. The European Commission has recently been 
pushing for arbitration by a more permanent tribunal, which would address some of the concerns raised by party-
appointed and party-paid arbitrators, but would still provide investors a private right of action to sue their host states 
to enforce treaty violations. (Coleman et al. 2017). 
2 See, e.g., Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Case No. 
ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction (Apr. 29, 2004); but see id., Dissenting Opinion of Chairman Prosper Weil, 
April 29, 2004. 
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same power to influence policy-making as a purely domestically owned company, if not more. 
Neither entity would have the direct right to cast a vote in elections; yet both, irrespective of 
ownership, could have equal indirect influence on policy issues that affect them through, for 
example, their own lobbying efforts and the positions taken and votes exercised by employees, 
consumers, suppliers, neighbors, and others with a stake in the firm’s operations and how those 
operations are governed (Henisz 2016 and Freeman et al. 2010).  
 
Second, foreign-owned MNEs are more likely than domestic firms to move their operations out 
of the country, and can potentially use their relative mobility to gain bargaining power over their 
host governments (Aisbett and Poulsen 2016). Third, foreign-owned MNEs may be able to 
leverage their home governments and/or international financial institutions to encourage or 
pressure host countries to provide the companies favorable treatment. Fourth, foreign-owned 
MNEs may be even more closely connected to the political elite in the host country than 
domestic firms. And fifth, foreign-owned MNEs may be more experienced than domestic firms 
in using “highly skilled negotiators and lobbyists to ensure favorable government treatment in 
host states” (Aisbett and Poulsen 2016, 5).  
 
Even if discrimination against MNEs were common at a time when the “global economy could 
much more easily be divided along national lines” and the nationality of different companies was 
clear, the modern era of globalization and liberalized capital flows has changed that picture 
(Lester 2016, 214 and UNCTAD 2016, 182). Domestic companies traditionally considered as 
“national champions” linked closely with domestic identity and prosperity are now often wholly 
or partially foreign-owned. Moreover, a firm that is popularly considered to be of or tied to its 
“home” country may conduct major segments of its activities and book large parts of its profits 
overseas. These new patterns have highlighted questions about the need and basis for 
distinguishing between foreign and domestic firms. (UNCTAD 2016).  
 
To the extent governments are drawing distinctions between domestic and foreign firms, the 
trend among governments is to compete for foreign capital, not discriminate against it. 
Governments, for example, often offer incentives and establish investment promotion agencies in 
order to attract foreign-owned companies, and provide those firms dedicated “after-care” 
services designed to help keep them in the country. Indeed, some studies have shown that 
governments treat foreign-owned firms better than domestically owned companies (Aisbett and 
Poulsen 2016 and Huang 2003). Others have found that governments treat multinational 
corporations–whether domestic- or foreign-owned–better than purely domestic firms with no 
international affiliates (Aisbett 2010). Examples of discrimination against foreign-owned firms 
today, therefore, may be more myth than reality.  
 
Furthermore, with the ability to structure firms across national lines and to access specialist 
advice from lawyers and consultants, MNEs (which may include those domestic firms involved 
in “round-tripping”) can identify and take advantage of benefits that purely domestic firms 
cannot. These include benefits derived from using corporate affiliates to book profits in low tax 
jurisdictions, engage in trade mispricing and regulatory arbitrage, and take advantage of 
international tax treaties (Nougayrède 2015). Based on these practices, MNEs can pay less in 
taxes than their domestic counterparts. MNEs are also able to strategically locate assets outside a 
host state’s borders in an effort to shield those assets from creditors seeking to secure payment 
 5 
for tax, environmental, or other liabilities. Given these modern realities and benefits enjoyed by 
MNEs, the case for extra special treatment for these entities through IIAs is far from self-evident. 
 
Yet even if there were discrimination against MNEs justifying enhanced supranational 
protection, the solution could be much more limited than is currently provided for in IIAs. For 
foreign-owned MNEs to have equal protection under the law and before courts would simply 
require domestic and international rules preventing discriminatory treatment.3 But IIAs typically 
do much more than merely require host states to grant MNEs the same rights and the same 
access to the same judicial remedies as domestic individuals and enterprises. Rather, IIAs require 
host states to provide MNEs certain standards of treatment that are often more favorable than 
treatment to which domestic individuals and entities are entitled. And it is this differential 
treatment that can undermine intra-national equality. The next section looks at how IIAs provide 
uniquely powerful procedural rights for MNEs as compared to (a) other private individuals and 
entities under international law, (b) governments under domestic law, and (c) other private 
individuals and entities under domestic law. The following section then highlights how IIAs 
provide MNEs privileged substantive property rights and economic power relative to other 
private stakeholders, creating and exacerbating inequality.  
IIAs and unequal procedural rights for MNEs 
 
In their IIAs, host states give MNEs the extraordinary power to bring ISDS claims against them 
in order to challenge, and seek compensation for, government conduct that breaches the IIAs’ 
provisions. As this section explains, the power to bring ISDS claims to challenge government 
conduct negatively impacting MNEs is uniquely strong, as compared to the powers of other 
private actors under both international law and domestic law. These asymmetries in power to 
initiate legal action and claim relief, standing alone, are examples of inequality before the law. 
And, even more importantly, ISDS tribunals can then shape the substantive contours of the law 
in a way that generates even more inequality.  
 
Extraordinary power under international law 
 
ISDS is a fundamental departure from traditional practice under international law. Traditionally, 
only states have had the power to enforce other states’ international law obligations. Only 
member states of the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, are entitled to use the 
WTO’s dispute resolution system to allege other WTO treaty parties have violated their WTO 
commitments and to seek remedies for breach of WTO law. Most other treaties follow this same 
                                                
3 There may be certain valid grounds for distinguishing between firms based on ownership. A number of countries 
have special rules and restrictions on foreign ownership for national security reasons. The presence of those rules, 
however, does not necessarily imply an absence of rights or remedies for improper discrimination. When, for 
example, U.S. President Barack Obama ordered a U.S. firm owned by Chinese nationals to sell certain assets in the 
US following an evaluation of the firm’s investment by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS), U.S. courts were open to the firm to challenge the CFIUS process and the President’s decision. The 
Appeals Court for the District of Columbia declared that the process and resulting decision were unconstitutional 
violations of the Chinese-owned company’s due process rights. Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States, et al., No. 1:12-cv-01513 (D.C. Ct. App. July 15, 2014). 
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model. The terms of the treaties might benefit private individuals and corporations, but they do 
not provide those actors direct rights of actions to enforce the treaties’ provisions.  
 
Some international human rights treaties adopt a different approach. Under these human rights 
instruments, individuals and, in some cases, corporations,4 are able to initiate claims against 
governments for violating their human rights. Nevertheless, there are limits on the abilities of 
those private actors to challenge government conduct. One key limit is the requirement that those 
seeking to challenge government conduct first exhaustively pursue relief through the domestic 
legal system. Accordingly, allegedly wrongful legislation, administrative actions, or judicial 
decisions of lower courts would typically need to be challenged through the judicial system 
before those measures or decisions could be challenged at the international level as violations of 
international law. Only once this requirement to exhaust domestic remedies is satisfied can 
private actors ask international human rights tribunals to adjudicate their claims and provide 
relief. This exhaustion requirement provides opportunities for governments to correct wrongs, 
and narrows the scope of measures that can and will give rise to international claims. 
 
IIAs’ provisions on ISDS depart from both of those approaches and give MNEs extraordinary 
privileges under international law. In contrast to the general norm in international law that only 
states may enforce other states’ treaty obligations, MNEs are able to initiate ISDS proceedings to 
challenge a host state’s breach of IIA standards. This, in turn, creates hundreds of thousands of 
potential claimants with the power to police compliance and seek remedies.5 Moreover, unlike in 
international human rights law, arbitral tribunals have relatively consistently ruled that MNEs 
bringing ISDS claims are not required to first exhaust their domestic remedies. This means that 
MNEs are able to challenge a broad set of administrative, judicial and legislative measures 
before international arbitral tribunals. If they prevail in their claims, MNEs are also able to use 
other treaties for the enforcement of international arbitral awards to ensure governments comply 
with the decisions issued against them.6 Thus, in international law, MNEs are uniquely 
positioned to be able to sue governments in supranational fora for the governments’ breach of 
their treaty commitments, and enforce decisions issued in their favor.  
 
Substantive protections given to MNEs are therefore more easily enforceable than other rights 
and interests–including human rights–that are protected under international law. One potential 
consequence of that disparity in enforcement regimes is that it will prompt governments to 
devote more resources to ensuring compliance with obligations regarding treatment of MNEs 
than to ensuring compliance with obligations owed under human rights or other treaty 
instruments. Another potential consequence is that, if there are tensions or arguable conflicts 
between observance of different treaty obligations (e.g., conflicts between protection of human 
rights and adherence to MNE protection standards), host states may favor adherence to the MNE 
                                                
4 Legal entities such as corporations are recognized as having rights under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Other international human rights bodies, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights, however, only permit claims by natural persons. 
5 These claimants are the hundreds of thousands firms that have been established around the world, and even the 
various shareholders in those firms. (UNCTAD 2016; Gaukrodger 2014).  
6 These treaties are the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the 
1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States.  
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protection obligations on the basis that breach of those obligations would be more likely to 
trigger litigation and financial liability.  
 
Thus, the exceptional nature of ISDS in international law threatens to result in disproportionate 
host government attention being paid to the rights and interests of MNEs as compared to the 
rights and interests of other stakeholders under international law.   
 
Extraordinary power to challenge government action 
 
The ability of MNEs to initiate ISDS proceedings is similarly exceptional as compared to the 
ability of private individuals and entities to challenge government conduct under many domestic 
legal systems.  
 
Domestic jurisdictions typically employ various doctrines that both permit and restrict 
government exposure to litigation and liability for different types of conduct. Comprehensive 
immunity of governments to lawsuits is critiqued on the ground that it prevents accountability 
and facilitates–and even encourages–negligent or knowingly wrongful conduct. When a 
government erects a legal framework enabling it to act with impunity, people are right to be 
concerned. But this is not to say that any person or entity aggrieved by any type of government 
conduct should have a right to challenge that conduct, and to seek compensation or other relief as 
a remedy. Broadly allowing individuals and entities to contest any government action or 
omission that negatively impacts their rights or interests, or the rights or interests of others, could 
unduly tie the hands of governments seeking to adopt and enforce important measures taken in 
the public interest. Ultimately, excessive exposure to claims and liability could grind 
governments to a halt.  
 
Decisions on whether and in what circumstances to (1) impose liability on governments and (2) 
compensate individuals or entities for harm, can have important behavioral impacts, 
incentivizing certain types of conduct and discouraging others. When shaping liability and 
compensation regimes, it is crucial to assess and understand those effects, and ensure that claims 
and remedies are designed to send the right signals and advance desired outcomes. Additionally, 
it is important to assess how availability of claims or remedies (or absence thereof) may be 
unequal in design or effect. Erecting systems that, whether in law or in practice, grant certain 
actors heightened powers to challenge governments can chill important regulatory policy or grant 
remedies for harms that only injure those actors’ interests.  
 
Based on these and other factors, domestic jurisdictions often have myriad rules on claims 
against the government. These rules relate to policy questions such as: which entity of 
government is best suited to make the appropriate determination of whether conduct is or is not 
lawful or appropriate (e.g., should courts make the ultimate decision on wrongfulness, 
administrative officials with technical expertise, legislators, or executive officials)? Should 
courts or administrative tribunals be able to revisit other government entities’ decisions, and if 
so, through which procedures? What impact will allowing claims or allowing certain types of 
remedies have on future government performance and/or for redress to victims? Who can bring 
claims (e.g., those who have been directly harmed, or anyone with an interest in the outcome of 
an issue)? What types of harms should be actionable through a legal challenge (e.g., economic 
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losses; losses to property; infringements of personal liberties; or government abdication of 
duties)? And what types of remedies should be available (e.g., monetary compensation, punitive 
damages, changes in the relevant law or policy)?  
 
All domestic individuals and firms, who are not covered by IIAs, are bound by these rules as 
defined by that domestic jurisdiction. Those who are covered by IIAs, however, can either bring 
their claims to domestic forums subject to these rules, or bypass such domestic legal restrictions 
by bringing their claims under IIAs and through the ISDS system, in which such domestic 
procedural restrictions do not apply. Under some IIAs, MNEs can even pursue relief through 
domestic channels and ISDS simultaneously.7  
 
Giving MNEs access to ISDS and the ability to sidestep domestic restraints on litigation gives 
MNEs greater power than non-MNEs to challenge government action and inaction. Even before 
an ISDS claim is filed or ISDS decision reached, the mere fact that MNEs alone have recourse to 
ISDS can potentially cause the government to devote greater attention and accord greater 
deference to the preferences and interests of MNEs than the government otherwise would; and, 
in some cases, this heightened attention will be to the detriment of competing preferences and 
interests (Van Harten and Scott 2017).  
 
If, for instance, a government decision to issue a permit would be opposed by environmentalists, 
and a decision to deny the permit would be opposed by an MNE, the agency responsible for 
deciding which option to pursue may be influenced by knowledge that the environmentalists 
could not mount a lawsuit challenging the government’s decision but that the MNE could sue the 
government for vast sums through ISDS. Similarly, when administrative and judicial 
enforcement of consumer protection laws are opposed by industry but supported by consumer 
advocates, governments may be influenced by the fact that the decision to prosecute a violator 
could trigger an ISDS claim by the firm, but a decision not to do so would not be challengeable 
by citizens the law was designed to protect. An ISDS suit by an MNE may, therefore, negatively 
impact the rights and interests of the MNE’s competitors, consumers, employees, and creditors. 
More diffuse interests, such as those who benefit from or ideologically support the 
environmental, labor, tax, antitrust or other government policy, may also be negatively impacted 
by an MNE’s use of ISDS to challenge relevant government conduct.  
 
As one commentator has explained when discussing the ability of different stakeholders to sue 
administrative bodies and challenge regulations, the type of inequality in procedural powers that 
is inherent in ISDS has  
 
fundamental and insidious impacts on the law-generating process as well. Government 
agencies do not want to spend time and resources defending regulations in court. If one 
side of the regulatory equation generally has standing to sue, and the other side does not, 
agencies are likely to favor the side that can sue them in their rulemaking decisions to 
                                                
7 To the extent foreign or domestic stakeholders dislike these rules limiting litigation in a given legal system, those 
stakeholders can, in at least some systems, seek to change them through legislative, administrative, and/or judicial 
action. See, e.g., supra, n. 3 (discussing Ralls case). 
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avoid the expenditure of resources necessary to defend regulations in court, the negative 
publicity, and disappointment inherent in having regulations struck down (Coplan 2009). 
 
Giving MNEs–and MNEs alone–such broad and privileged access to “judicial” review through 
ISDS is especially problematic in an era in which political legislative and executive branches of 
government are already disproportionately attentive to (or captured by) wealthy individuals and 
corporate interests (Andrias 2015; Drutman 2015, 71; Gilens and Page 2014; and Stiglitz 2012). 
Gilens’ analysis of federal legislative activity in the United States, for example, finds evidence 
that the “political system is tilted very strongly in favor of those at the top of the income 
distribution,” (Gilens 2012, 70) and that legislative responsiveness to the policy preferences of 
the middle class and poor in the United States are “virtually nonexistent,” except when those 
preferences happen to align with the preferences of the top 10 percent in terms of income (Gilens 
2012, 83). This outsized influence of the wealthy over government action, in turn, produces 
economic inequalities among constituents. Political scientists have highlighted how political 
decisions are creating and entrenching economic inequality through the issues they prioritize, 
and those they do not (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Andrias 2015). To combat those trends of 
wealth influencing politics and politics further generating wealth inequality, judicial review of 
government action can play a key role. 
 
Indeed, the judicial branch of government has come to be seen by many commentators and 
theorists as the branch that is the most insulated from the influence of powerful, wealthy 
stakeholders (Schlozman and Tierney 1986), and the branch that is therefore best-placed to 
address and remedy the weighty influence that wealthy individuals and firms can have over 
legislative, executive, and administrative decisions (Andrias 2015; Schiller 2000; Peterson 
2014). Consequently, that only MNEs (and their investors) are able to challenge government 
conduct through ISDS, in which disputes are removed from domestic courts to private arbitration 
by party-appointed arbitrators, can further strengthen the influence of wealthy individuals and 
industry over government decision-making, exacerbating domestic inequality. 
 
There are several additional characteristics of IIAs and ISDS that make MNEs’ unique access to 
arbitral tribunals extraordinarily powerful and intensify concerns that ISDS will worsen, not 
ameliorate, wealth’s influence over lawmaking. One is that, in contrast to most advanced systems 
of corporate law, IIAs have been interpreted to allow direct shareholders–including even 
minority, non-controlling shareholders–to bring ISDS claims seeking compensation for harms to 
the company in which they hold shares (Gaukrodger 2014). Additionally, many IIAs permit (or 
have been interpreted to permit) claims by shareholders in MNEs up the ownership chain such as 
claims by intermediate holding companies and ultimate beneficial owners. Thus, when a measure 
affects a single MNE within its borders, a government may face a number of ISDS claims from 
that firm’s various direct and indirect shareholders.8 
 
When a government measure impacts a whole industry, the number of potential claims and 
claimants multiplies. Each separate claim will likely require the state to incur additional defense 
                                                
8 While some treaties attempt to address these issues by requiring consolidation of certain claims, or by only 
allowing controlling shareholders to bring claims seeking relief for harms to the company in which they hold shares, 
those treaties are few in number and do not offer complete solutions to the problems they seek to address.  
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and arbitration costs,9 which, at an estimated USD 5 million per case per side, are significant 
(Hodgson 2014).10 And, MNEs who lose their ISDS claims are only infrequently ordered to 
compensate states for their legal expenses (in 38 percent of the cases that MNEs lose), less 
frequently than the percentage of cases in which tribunals require losing states to compensate 
successful MNEs for their legal expenses (53 percent of cases in which states lose) (Hodgson 
2014, 756). 
 
As well as increasing states’ defense costs, multiple claims also give MNEs multiple chances to 
win their claims. MNEs can advance different arguments and/or appoint different arbitrators with 
the hope that their arguments prevail in at least one of their cases. Because there is no system of 
precedent in ISDS arbitration binding one tribunal to decisions previously issued by another, the 
fact that some shareholders lose before one arbitral tribunal does not prevent other shareholders 
from bringing a case against the same government challenging the same measure, or from 
subsequently prevailing.11 Thus, when a government seeks to shift policies in an industry where 
there are multiple firms with at least some foreign shareholders, that government may face a 
veritable barrage of ISDS litigation and potential liability, a risk that further increases the 
leverage of MNEs in their negotiations and disputes with host governments. Given these issues, 
it is foreseeable, if not expected, that firms will increasingly organize themselves, and 
shareholders will increasingly structure their holdings, so as to ensure that when governments act 
or fail to act in their interests, they can mount ISDS claims to contest or secure damages for that 
conduct. 
 
Extraordinary power to challenge the rights and interests of non-MNEs 
 
In addition to giving MNEs greater power than non-MNEs vis-à-vis the government, ISDS also 
gives MNEs greater power than non-MNEs in legal disputes directly between those two groups.  
 
Assume, for example, that a domestic citizen successfully sues an MNE in the courts of the host 
country for harms caused by the MNE, and is awarded monetary compensation for injuries 
suffered. The MNE may then be able to turn to ISDS to seek to undo or otherwise eliminate the 
effects of its court loss. In contrast, if the MNE were to have prevailed in the domestic court 
proceedings, the domestic citizen would have no similar power to seek a different outcome 
through ISDS. With access to ISDS, MNEs thus have greater opportunities to get their desired 
results than their non-MNE opponents do.   
 
                                                
9 States may be able to consolidate claims brought by different investors, which can minimize defense costs. 
Nevertheless, even if the effort to consolidate is successful, that effort itself will likely result in additional 
arbitration-related expenses.  
10 Hodgson found the defense costs for respondent states to average USD 4.5 million, plus the state’s portion of the 
tribunal’s costs, which averaged USD 750,000. 
11 For examples of cases involving the same investment, and same government conduct, but brought by different 
investors and coming to different conclusions see, e.g., (1) CME v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, 
September 13, 2001, and Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, September 3, 2001; and (2) Teco v. 
Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, Award, December 19, 2013, and Iberdola Energía v. Guatemala, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/09/5, Award, August 17, 2012.  
 11 
One example of a case following this pattern is Chevron v. Ecuador.12 That dispute arose out of a 
lawsuit in which Ecuadorian citizens sued Chevron for pollution caused by oil operations in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon. An Ecuadorian court sided with the Ecuadorian plaintiffs, who are 
commonly referred to as the “Lago Agrio Plaintiffs” due to the location of the oil operations, and 
ordered Chevron to pay them roughly $18 billion in damages (which was reduced by an 
Ecuadorian appellate court decision to $9 billion). In order to avoid having to pay the Lago 
Agrio Plaintiffs that award of compensation, Chevron initiated an ISDS case against Ecuador.  
 
In the ISDS proceedings, Chevron argued that the Ecuadorian legal processes that produced the 
award were marred by government corruption and collusion between the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs 
and judicial officials. Chevron also argued that, even if there were no fraud or corruption, “the 
Lago Agrio Judgment’s factual findings, legal holdings, and assessment of damages are so 
unjust” that they constitute a denial of justice in breach of the IIA.13 As part of that position, 
Chevron disputed a number of findings made by the Ecuadorian courts on issues such as the 
extent of environmental damage in the Amazonian region, the cause of contamination, and the 
crucial question of who is legally responsible to pay for harms done.   
 
Through its ISDS case, Chevron asked for a number of remedies that would directly impact the 
Lago Agrio Plaintiffs and their ability to obtain compensation for environmental harms. 
Chevron, for example, asked the arbitral tribunal to declare that “Chevron is not liable for any 
judgment rendered in the Lago Agrio Litigation,”14 and that the Lago Agrio judgment itself is a 
“nullity as a matter of international law,”15 is “unlawful and consequently devoid of any legal 
effect,”16 and is “not final, conclusive or enforceable.”17 Chevron also requested that the tribunal 
“order Ecuador to use all measures necessary” to prevent the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs from 
collecting their award of compensation.18  
 
As of December 15, 2016, the ISDS dispute was still pending. Nevertheless, the arbitral tribunal 
issued an interim award granting Chevron’s request to order Ecuador “to take all measures 
necessary….whether by its judicial, legislative or executive branches….to suspend or cause to be 
suspended the enforcement and recognition within and without Ecuador of [the Lago Agrio 
judgment].”19  
 
                                                
12 Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Case No. 2009-23. 
13 Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Supplemental Memorial on Track 2, para. 104 
(May 9, 2014). 
14 Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Memorial on the Merits, para. 547 (September 6, 
2010). 
15 Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Supplemental Memorial on Track 2, para. 199 
(May 9, 2014). 
16 Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Supplemental Memorial on Track 2, para. 199 
(May 9, 2014). 
17 Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Memorial on the Merits, para. 547 (September 6, 
2010). 
18 Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Memorial on the Merits, para. 547 (September 6, 
2010). 
19 Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Second Interim Award on Interim Measures, para. 3(i) 
(February 16, 2012). 
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Thus, though Chevron’s case was principally against Ecuador, it also sought to, and succeeded 
in, impacting the outcome of the underlying litigation between Chevron and the Lago Agrio 
Plaintiffs. It also succeeded in impacting the answer to the question of who pays for 
environmental harms caused by oil operations: those affected by the pollution, taxpayers, and/or 
oil companies. Under the tribunal’s order, the costs of those harms will continue to be born by 
affected individuals and communities, not by Chevron or Ecuador. 
 
Although affected by the tribunal’s award, the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs have had no right or ability 
to participate in the ISDS proceedings in order to dispute Chevron’s claims and protect the 
judgment they had fought for years to secure. ISDS is limited to claims by MNEs (or their 
investors) against their host states; treaties concluded to date do not permit third-parties to 
intervene in and join the arbitrations even if the subject of the arbitration or the arbitration itself, 
as in the Chevron v. Ecuador dispute, impacts those third-parties’ rights or interests. By only 
allowing investors to access ISDS, and excluding full participation by affected third-parties, IIAs 
give rise to inequalities in procedural rights. These procedural inequalities, in turn, can 
exacerbate substantive inequalities such as inequalities in terms of who suffers from, who 
benefits from, and who pays for environmental damage.  
 
Another example of a dispute in which the loser in domestic court proceedings turned to ISDS 
for relief is Eli Lilly v. Canada.20 That ISDS case arose out of litigation between a generic drug 
company and Eli Lilly regarding the validity of two pharmaceutical patents held by Eli Lilly. 
When the generics company sought to manufacture and sell generic versions of Eli Lilly’s 
patented drugs, Eli Lilly sued it for patent infringement. But the generics company prevailed, 
permitting it and other generic drug manufacturers to sell their versions of the drugs in Canada.  
 
Having lost in Canada, Eli Lilly turned to ISDS under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). In contrast to the ISDS case initiated by Chevron, Eli Lilly did not allege 
that there was any corruption, fraud, or breaches of due process in the underlying Canadian 
judicial processes. Rather, Eli Lilly alleged that Canada’s courts had developed new patent law 
doctrines that improperly imposed new, heightened, and arbitrary requirements for patentability 
on firms, and that the change in requirements - and the requirements themselves- violated the 
NAFTA. According to Eli Lilly, the decisions by Canadian courts invalidating Eli Lilly’s patents 
entitled Eli Lilly to at least CDN $500 million as compensation for what it claims was a 
wrongful interference with its intellectual property rights.  
 
As in Chevron v. Ecuador, Eli Lilly attempted to use ISDS to secure a different outcome than 
had resulted from private litigation in the host country. It asked the arbitral tribunal to declare 
that the substantive contours of Canadian patent law violated the NAFTA. And again, due to 
how IIAs have structured ISDS, the generic drug company that had been involved in the 
underlying Canadian litigation could not be party to the ISDS arbitration, despite the fact that the 
case centered on the validity of the decisions on Canadian patent law that the generics firm had 
successfully fought for and secured.  
 
                                                
20 ICSID Case No. ARB/14/2.  
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Eli Lilly thus further illustrates how ISDS can provide one party in domestic litigation with extra 
procedural avenues to prevail over its opponent. Although Eli Lilly did not directly ask the 
arbitral tribunal to undo or prevent enforcement of the Canadian court judgments, the relief Eli 
Lilly sought–an order requiring Canada to compensate Eli Lilly for loss of its monopoly rights 
and other companies’ use of “its” patents–could have made it cost prohibitive for Canada to 
uphold those court decisions.   
 
Ultimately, Eli Lilly lost its NAFTA case. The tribunal decided that Eli Lilly had failed to prove 
that the shift in Canada’s intellectual property laws was sufficiently dramatic or arbitrary to 
violate the NAFTA. Nevertheless, the arbitrators declared that it was entirely proper for ISDS 
tribunals to reevaluate the outcomes of domestic court cases between private litigants even in the 
absence of any denial of justice or evidence of corruption in those proceedings.  
 
Cases like Eli Lilly have weighty public policy implications regarding incentives for and abilities 
of individuals and firms to innovate, the extent of openness and competition in a given market, 
and the pricing of medicines and other products. For example, strong patent protections such as 
those sought by drug developers convey monopolistic power on patent holders, which can in turn 
impact the relative strength and success of other firms who develop or manufacture products 
(e.g., favoring innovative drug companies holding patents over generics firms seeking to produce 
the patented technologies). Disproportionately strong patent protections also exacerbate 
inequality among individuals in terms of their ability to access healthcare and other goods and 
services derived from patented innovations (Liu 2014; Chang 2012). Consequently, ISDS may 
reshape the substantive contours of the law in a manner that generates more inequality among 
both producers and consumers.  
 
Chevron and Eli Lilly underscore how ISDS grants MNEs a formidable and privileged 
procedural mechanism, and how investors’ use of that procedural mechanism to get one more 
“bite at the apple” may create or exacerbate substantive inequalities between, on the one hand, 
MNEs and their shareholders and, on the other hand, all other stakeholders. Other ISDS cases 
illustrate the breadth of the problem. Investors have used ISDS to contest decisions regarding the 
relative rights of creditors and debtors in bankruptcy proceedings,21 contests over land 
ownership,22 citizen suits challenging permitting decisions for extractive industry operations,23 
and other unfavorable litigation proceedings and outcomes between the MNEs and other private 
individuals and entities before domestic courts.  
 
Treaties could be drafted in such a way as to preclude investors from using ISDS to alter the 
effect of domestic litigation with other private parties. They could, for example, contain language 
stating that a case must be dismissed if there are individuals and entities whose interests would 
be affected by the ISDS proceedings, but who are nevertheless not able to join them. Treaties 
could also contain language giving those whose interests may be affected by the proceedings the 
                                                
21 See, e.g., Dan Cake v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, August 24, 
2015. 
22 See, e.g., Awdi v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/13, Award, March 2, 2015. 
23 See, e.g., Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5, Request for Arbitration, February 6, 2014, and 
Petition for Amicus Curiae Status, September 15, 2014. 
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right to join the arbitration as full parties (though this would potentially require them to have to 
incur the costs of investment arbitration, which on average have been estimated to be US$10 
million per case and might not be feasible for all to pay) (Hodgson 2014). Such provisions can be 
found in procedural rules of domestic courts in order to prevent court decisions from overriding 
the rights and interests of those who are not party to the case.24  
 
Even absent such express language, tribunals could also arguably invoke existing principles of 
international law to decline to hear cases or order relief that would impact the rights of non-
parties. To date, however, tribunals have not appeared receptive to these issues or arguments. In 
Chevron v. Ecuador, for example, Ecuador argued that, pursuant to principles of international 
law, the tribunal should not take jurisdiction over Chevron’s claims or grant its requested relief 
as doing so would impact the rights of the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.25 The tribunal, however, 
rejected that argument, declaring with little analysis that its hearing of the case would not impact 
the rights of the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs, and then issued the interim award preventing the Lago 
Agrio Plaintiffs from collecting their award of compensation.26    
  
IIAs and unequal substantive property rights 
 
Particularly because property rights are a zero-sum game in which “protecting the resource 
claims of some parties requires preventing others from using those same resources,” (Lawson-
Remer 2012, 151) decisions on their definition and scope are a product of a rich history and 
ongoing contestation (Kennedy 2011, 10). Distributions of economic, social, and political power 
shape property rights; and, in turn, property rights can shape those distributions of power 
(Kennedy 2011, 12). 
 
Traditionally, international law has left domestic jurisdictions–and the social forces, political 
processes, and legal institutions within them–significant latitude to define the scope of property 
rights and allocate them among members of society (Sasson 2010). To the extent that 
international law has been relevant to protection of property, it has largely been confined to 
assessing whether states have violated extant or vested property rights in breach of customary 
international law or treaties protecting human rights (Sasson 2010).27 Thus, international law has 
generally not defined or created property rights; rather, it has limited state interference with 
them.  
 
                                                
24 See, e.g., US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, R.19.  
25 See, e.g., Chevron v. Ecuador, Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, paras. 3.83-3.85, 3.139 
(February 27, 2012); Chevron v. Ecuador, Respondent Track 2 Counter-Memorial on Merits, paras. 516-525 
(February 18, 2013).   
26 Chevron v. Ecuador, Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, paras. 4.59-4.71 (February 27, 
2012); Chevron v. Ecuador, Second Interim Award on Interim Measures, para. 3 (February 16, 2012). 
27 But see, e.g., Nigel Bankes, “Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Territory through the Property 
Rights Provisions of International Regional Human Rights instruments,” 3 Yearbook of Polar Law 57, 66-67 (2011); 
see also Sasson, pp. 66-67 (discussing Anglo-Italian Conciliation Commission, Raibl Claim, June 19, 1964, 40 ILR 
260-288 (1970)). 
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IIAs, however, have changed that. Rather than merely protecting property rights as defined and 
redefined through domestic processes, IIAs–and, in particular, their “fair and equitable 
treatment” obligations28–have effectively become a tool for creating new property rights to be 
enjoyed by MNEs. These provisions, as interpreted, limit the ability of governments to take 
action that interfere with those IIA-created rights, and diminish the property rights of other 
stakeholders, undermining efforts to reduce inequality. 
 
Creating New Substantive Rights through the “Fair and Equitable Treatment” Standard  
 
IIAs require host states to provide MNEs “fair and equitable treatment (FET).” But, 
fundamentally, protecting MNEs’ conceptions of what is fair and equitable may have unfair or 
inequitable impacts on others. For example, environmental laws imposing new and costly 
emissions standards on manufacturing plants may be viewed as unfair or inequitable from a 
firm’s perspective unless those laws exempt existing plants that had long operated under more 
lax regimes and for which compliance costs would be high. But exempting such older, existing 
facilities would be unfair and inequitable from the perspective of those individuals living near 
the polluting plants who are left to disproportionately suffer the harms of air pollution from 
unregulated facilities (Gorovitz Robertson 1995). And are measures that provide special 
exceptions or flexibilities to environmental laggards fair and equitable from the perspective of 
manufacturing firms that voluntarily incurred costs to upgrade their facilities in anticipation of 
future regulation? Similar questions about the equities and inequities of law arise with respect to 
taxation, labor law and employee benefits, social services, tort law, and myriad other areas.  
 
A danger with IIAs and ISDS is that they expressly only seek to ensure fair and equitable 
treatment of MNEs and their owners, with no meaningful opportunity for those who may be 
unfairly or inequitably impacted by MNEs’ calls for fair and equitable treatment to present their 
views to tribunals. Of course, the FET obligation could be interpreted in a manner in which 
fairness to MNEs takes into account fairness to others; but there are no guarantees arbitral 
tribunals will adopt such a holistic vision of fairness. Indeed, cases decided to date suggest 
otherwise. 
 
In fact, in their interpretations of the fair and equitable treatment standard, tribunals have been 
effectively creating new property rights for MNEs through their pronouncements that IIAs’ FET 
obligation protects MNEs’ “legitimate expectations.” Specifically, arbitral tribunals interpreting 
and applying IIAs have created a legal doctrine through which they will protect certain 
expectations held by foreign investors regarding future government treatment, and will order 
host states to pay compensation if actual government conduct deviates from those expectations. 
Arbitral tribunals thereby effectively convert mere expectations regarding treatment of foreign-
owned firms into legally recognized rights enforceable against the state.  
 
The expectations that have been effectively turned into legally enforceable property rights are 
extremely diverse, including the right to continue to enjoy government subsidies,29 the right to be 
                                                
28 Also relevant are tribunals’ interpretation of the indirect expropriation standard. This paper, however, focuses on 
the FET obligation and its role as a tool for creating new property rights.  
29 Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award, December 11, 2013. 
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free from having to pay higher taxes,30 the right to be awarded permits for activities such as 
developing hazardous waste sites,31 the right to enjoy certain rates of return in public 
infrastructure projects,32 and the right to have tariffs for public services (e.g., water or energy) 
determined in accordance with particular investor-approved formulas or at levels “expected” by 
the investors.33 In none of these cases was the “expectation” held by the MNE clearly recognized 
as a “right” under the host country’s domestic legal framework. Rather, the existence and nature 
of those rights were contested due to questions regarding the scope of the state’s power to adjust 
economic benefits and burdens, or effects on those holding competing interests or rights claims.  
 
For example, in Micula v. Romania,34 a dispute regarding foreign-owned firms’ alleged right to 
receive government subsidies, Romania contended that the MNEs had no vested right to continue 
to receive subsides in future years and that the government had the power to terminate those 
supports. Romania further argued that recognizing a right to continued receipt of subsidies would 
be inconsistent with applicable law and policy restricting government grants of subsidies due to 
concerns that such subsidies could result in welfare-reducing effects on competition, constituted 
a waste of government resources, and were an inappropriate transfer of wealth from taxpayers to 
select private interests.  
 
The arbitral tribunal in the Micula case determined that it need not decide whether or not 
Romanian law had created and conferred on the MNEs’ property rights to continue to receive 
government subsidies. Nor did the tribunal engage with the concerns underlying the 
government’s efforts to terminate subsidies deemed to be inconsistent with policy aims, or the 
question of whether, based on those concerns and policies, the MNEs might have expected their 
government benefits would end. Instead, the tribunal decided that the MNEs had “legitimate 
expectations” that they would be able to continue to benefit from those subsidies and that the 
government’s decision to terminate the subsidies violated those expectations. The tribunal then 
ordered the government to pay the value of those future subsidies as compensation.  
 
The arbitral tribunal therefore effectively created and conferred on the MNEs and their investors 
the right to continue to receive government subsidies (at the expense of other Romanian 
taxpayers and business competitors). The tribunal also undermined the power of Romania’s legal 
and political institutions to determine whether MNEs had such a right to receive government 
subsidies and, if so, on what terms. Arbitral tribunals in ISDS proceedings have assumed the role 
of identifying which economic interests are recognized and protected by the law and have 
assigned themselves the power to erect a property rights framework that can depart from norms 
established in domestic legal systems through constitutions, legislation, court decisions, or other 
channels. By converting investors’ and MNEs’ “legitimate expectations” regarding their 
economic activities into enforceable property rights, and requiring the state (taxpayers) to 
                                                
30 Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and Liability, 
September 12, 2014. 
31 Tecmed v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, May 29, 2003. 
32 Walter Bau v. Thailand, UNCITRAL, Award, July 1, 2009. 
33 Teco v. Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, Award, December 19, 2013. 
34 ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award, December 11, 2013. 
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compensate investors for loss of those “rights,” tribunals effect a transfer of wealth from the 
public to investors and MNEs. 
 
Whose expectations are protected?  
 
According to tribunals, “legitimate expectations” can arise from the general legal and regulatory 
framework in place at the time an investor makes its investment, especially when those 
expectations are based on government officials’ representations or assurances to investors. 
 
Those with the strongest claims to favorable “legitimate expectations,” therefore, are those who 
have had direct communications with presidents, ministers, or other often high-level government 
representatives and have received promises or other encouragements regarding prospects for the 
investments and advantages offered by the host state’s legal and businesses environment. These 
MNEs are frequently companies developing or operating major infrastructure projects for water, 
energy, and transportation services; firms engaged in exploration for and extraction of oil, gas, or 
minerals; and businesses constructing or operating major real estate or tourism projects. In short, 
companies that have the best claims to “legitimate expectations” are often firms that have 
benefitted from a closeness with government that most individuals and entities will never enjoy. 
This widens the gap between the power of those with the ear of the government and those 
without.  
 
What expectations are “legitimate”? 
 
ISDS decisions have held that investors’ “legitimate expectations” based on government 
representations or assurances must be upheld even if those representations or assurances were 
non-binding or illegal under domestic law.35 If, for instance, an executive official were to 
represent to a foreign-owned firm that the contract terms the MNE sought for an infrastructure 
project were acceptable, but a court later deemed the relevant contract invalid under the 
constitution or other domestic law, the firm may be able to prevail on an ISDS claim that the 
court decision violated its “legitimate expectations” of benefitting from the contract. Through 
that approach, the ISDS decision would effectively allow the executive official’s representation 
to prevail over broader domestic legal norms.  
 
Binding the government to (or requiring compensation for) unlawful, non-binding, and often 
non-public representations or commitments can upset normal separation of powers by effectively 
giving executive officials the ability to knowingly or negligently override or bypass limits set by 
the legislature. Moreover, enforcing such unlawful or unauthorized promises can encourage 
improper collusion between the project proponent and those in the government that support the 
                                                
35 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines [II], ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/12, Award, December 10, 2014, paras. 482-519; Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of 
Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Second Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, May 18, 2010, para. 146; 
Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, February 6, 2008, para. 120; 
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines [I], ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, 
Award, August 16, 2007, para. 346 (subsequently annulled on other grounds). MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Chile, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award (May 25, 2004).  
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proposed investment. Assume, for instance, that executive officials want to give a project 
proponent a broad guarantee of fiscal stability in order to encourage the project’s development 
but, to preserve tax policy flexibility over time and to ensure tax policy is set by the legislature, 
those executive officials do not have authority under domestic law to provide any commitment 
that fiscal policies will remain unchanged. The doctrine of “legitimate expectations” means that 
the executive officials could nevertheless agree to a contractual stabilization clause, knowing 
that, once given, that contractual promise might become too costly to break.  
 
In some domestic legal systems, courts protect against such collusive conduct by imposing strict 
rules against enforcement of unauthorized or illegal promises. As stated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, for example, when affirming the U.S. rule that legal force will not be given to illegitimate 
representations by agency officials:  
 
If agents of the Executive were able, by their unauthorized oral or written statements to 
citizens, to obligate the Treasury for the payment of funds, the control over public funds 
that the [Constitution] reposes in Congress [governing appropriation of funds] in effect 
could be transferred to the Executive. If, for example, the President or Executive Branch 
officials were displeased with a new restriction on benefits imposed by Congress …. and 
sought to evade them, agency officials could advise citizens that the restrictions were 
inapplicable. [A legal doctrine binding the government to the officials’ advice] would 
give this advice the practical force of law, in violation of the Constitution.36 
 
Yet not only does the doctrine of “legitimate expectations” in ISDS reject that approach, 
favoring protection of investors’ reliance interests over protection of the rule of law in the 
domestic legal system, but the doctrine of “legitimate expectations” could also result in an IIA 
breach if domestic courts, like the U.S.’s, were to refuse to enforce illegal promises. If a 
domestic court ruled that the fiscal stabilization provision was invalid, the MNE could bring an 
ISDS suit challenging that court decision as a violation of its expectations.  
 
Recourse to ISDS also gives rise to another opportunity for improper collusion between investors 
and certain government officials and a mechanism to disrupt the balance of governmental 
powers. The executive branch which, in many countries, has control over decisions regarding 
litigation and settlement of ISDS claims, could simply agree as part of a settlement to abide by 
an unauthorized or illegal stabilization commitment in order to dispose of the case and entrench 
its policy preferences regarding fiscal stabilization. That settlement agreement can then be 
enshrined as an “award” by the ISDS tribunal, which would make it binding on the host country 
even if the terms of the agreement were illegal under that country’s domestic law.  
 
Even apart from any intentional corrupt collusion in settlement discussions conducted outside 
normal law-making processes, there are serious questions about whether and under what 
circumstances negotiated settlements adequately reflect the interests of all those with a stake in 
the litigation. Because governments serve diverse constituents with different and potentially 
competing interests, it may be difficult if not impossible for the government to equally and fully 
                                                
36 Richmond v. Office of Personnel Management, 496 U.S. 414, 428 (1990). 
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represent all views when litigating and settling cases.37 The perspectives of some constituents–
particularly those who are politically weak–may therefore not be taken into account by 
government positions when the government is seeking to dispose of a case.  
 
In light of those risks and realities, at least some domestic jurisdictions have developed rules and 
mechanisms under domestic law to ensure that government settlements represent broader public 
interests and are consistent with the law, and to enable stakeholders to directly protect their 
interests in court. These include mechanisms allowing interested individuals and entities to 
intervene in disputes between the government and other private parties and challenge terms of 
settlement agreements; and rules requiring the judicial branch to assess whether settlement 
agreements are in the public interest before approving them. ISDS, however, contains no such 
mechanisms for third-party intervention or public interest oversight. Consequently, given the 
often "numerous complex and conflicting interests" at the local, regional, and/or national level 
that a state sued in an ISDS case may be responsible for defending, there is a real risk that the 
interests of the most marginalized “may become lost in the thicket of” or sacrificed in 
“sometimes inconsistent governmental policies."38  
 
Assume the following fact pattern: an MNE seeking to develop a coastal tourism project secured 
a concession from national-level officials for that project and was told that the land was 
government-owned and not inhabited by others. Local residents, however, claimed ownership of 
the land and argued that, under domestic law of eminent domain, the land could not be 
expropriated from them to be given to another private party. The local residents then filed and 
succeeded on a claim before domestic courts that the concession was in fact improperly granted, 
and the court ordered termination of the concession. After the court award, the MNE brought an 
ISDS claim challenging the decision and seeking (1) an order from the tribunal mandating the 
government to take all steps necessary to prevent enforcement of that domestic court judgment; 
or (2) hundreds of millions of dollars in damages from alleged lost future profits. Indeed, there 
are many actual examples of tribunals similarly ordering governments to interfere in judicial 
proceedings or outcomes,39 as well as ordering governments to pay hundreds of millions of 
dollars in future lost profits for frustrated projects.40  
 
Whether because it wants the tourism project to go ahead, does not want to risk an adverse 
judgment and potential liability for hundreds of millions of dollars, or does not want to face the 
reputational costs and potential lost-future investment that an ISDS claim can bring, (Alee and 
Peinhardt 2011) the government entity responsible for defending the case may opt to settle the 
case and allow the development to proceed notwithstanding the competing rights and interests of 
the local citizens. If that settlement agreement is then reflected in an arbitral award, the 
government could argue that its international law obligations trump domestic law decisions, and 
                                                
37 U.S. cases in support of this principle include Utah Association of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1255 (10th 
Cir. 2001); Kleissler v. United States Forest Service, 157 F.3d 964, 973-974 (3rd Cir. Ct. App. 1998); Am. Farm 
Bureau Fedn v. United States EPA, 278 F.R.D. 98 (M.D. Pa. 2011). For a discussion of some of these issues, see 
Michael T. Morley, Consent of the Governed or Consent of the Government? The Problems with Consent Decrees in 
Government-Defendant Cases, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 637 (2014). 
38 Kleissler v. United States Forest Service, 157 F.3d 964, 973-974 (3rd Cir. Ct. App. 1998). 
39 See supra nn. 12-19, 25-27 (discussing Chevron v. Ecuador).  
40 See, e.g., Gold Reserve v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, Sept. 22, 2014.  
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that therefore the domestic court decision is invalid or preempted, undermining the rights of the 
affected communities. 
 
In summary, because the doctrine of “legitimate expectations” provides disproportionate 
protection to those with unique access to government officials, and can bind governments to 
promises irrespective of whether those promises are authorized or legal, that doctrine allows 
MNEs to distort law in their favor without having to secure support necessary for legislative or 
constitutional change. 
 
Using “legitimate expectations” to protect the status quo 
 
Protection of MNEs’ “legitimate expectations” is particularly favorable to existing asset holders 
and powerful interests, compensating them for changes to the status quo. The general rule 
adopted by tribunals is that the doctrine of “legitimate expectations” protects expectations held at 
the time the investment is made, including that the legal framework governing or affecting an 
MNE will not change over time (or will not change much)41 through court decisions, 
administrative actions, shifts in policies or practices, changes in legislation or other means of 
legal evolution.  
 
If subsequent government conduct exceeds the MNE’s “legitimate expectations,” granting more 
favorable treatment than the MNE had anticipated at the time of the investment, then the MNE 
keeps those gains; but if the government frustrates the investor’s expectations, the government 
may be ordered to compensate them for any difference between their hoped-for and actual 
economic position.  
 
One likely effect will be that, over time, the legal and policy framework will become 
increasingly favorable to MNEs. Because IIAs typically only permit investors to initiate claims 
against states (neither states nor other individuals or entities may initiate IIA claims against 
MNEs), the outcomes of ISDS decisions will only ever be to (1) uphold the property rights 
framework as they existed under the host state’s domestic law, or (2) expand the property rights 
protections enjoyed by investors under that law. ISDS proceedings will never narrow the 
property rights enjoyed by MNEs under host state law. Thus, beyond the specific effects that 
protection of “legitimate expectations” has in a particular case, the structure of the ISDS system 
is such that, over time, it will lead to a general expansion of the legal protections for MNEs’ 
economic interests, and corresponding expansion of state (taxpayer) liability for conduct 
interfering with those interests.  
 
This effect of protecting the status quo against change that negatively impacts MNEs can also 
entrench or increase inequality among firms by safeguarding the power of market incumbents as 
compared to new players. If, for example, a government decides to remove or decrease subsidies 
given to existing businesses (e.g., coal-fired power plants), and/or increase subsidies given to 
potential new competitors (e.g., generators of renewable energy), that may trigger an ISDS claim 
for breach of the FET obligation by the incumbents. Similarly, if the government passes new 
                                                
41 See, e.g., Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, para. 154 
(May 29, 2003).  
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environmental or other obligations that would impose new costs on firms, it may readily agree to 
exempt incumbents from having to comply so as not to trigger a dispute, thereby favoring 
incumbents relative to newcomers.  
 
In addition to disadvantaging those competitors without access to ISDS, the ability of MNEs to 
entrench favorable aspects of the status quo harms other interests that would benefit from 
adjustments to law and policy. As one scholar studying the powerful impact of money in slowing 
US lawmaking has concluded, “[w]ealth interests affect inaction disproportionately and benefit 
from it uniquely” (Andrias 2015, 425-26). Indeed, FET provisions are not the only forces against 
change. Scholars studying legal trends have found a general status quo bias limiting legal reform 
in democratic states (Gilens and Page 2014, 74 and Hacker et al. 2015, 183) and political 
scientists have identified the phenomenon of drift, through which vested, non-majoritarian 
interests can work behind the scenes to prevent voters and other public interests from updating 
the legal framework to take into account changing circumstances (Hacker et al. 2015, 184). Thus, 
inequality-entrenching policy stagnation appears to be a reality even in the absence of IIAs and 
ISDS, though IIAs and ISDS provide new and powerful channels for counteracting legal and 
policy adjustments. 
 
Notably, MNEs have relied on FET protections to prevent legal systems from evolving to 
combat three of the most inequality-inducing effects that can arise from property rights systems–
negative externalities, abusive practices of monopoly rights holders, and undue appropriation of 
gains. The first, negative externalities, result from property rights holders seeking to maximize 
gains from their uses of property by pushing costs onto others (Merrill 2012). A typical example 
of this is a company that, when producing a product for sale, generates harmful pollutants and is 
able to dispose of those pollutants in the air, in water, or on land owned by the general public 
who will then suffer the harms and bear the costs of such pollution. The second negative effect 
property rights protections can generate is the risk of abuse of monopoly powers through which 
the holder of a monopoly right can extract onerous payments from those seeking to use or benefit 
from that right. One example of this is when a pharmaceutical company holds a patent over a 
life-saving drug for which there are no substitutes, and for which the company can therefore 
charge sick patients an exorbitant price; another example is when a company has a monopoly 
over the right to distribute and sell water, and can set high prices for that essential resource 
without fear of losing consumers to competitors. A third negative consequence that systems of 
property rights protections can produce is a direct increase in inequality that can arise when 
systems allow the rights-holder to appropriate all of the gains in value attributable to the right it 
holds (Merrill 2012). This aspect of property rights systems through which “property beget[s] 
more property” can be positive in that it can “create an incentive for the owner to work hard to 
make the resource” it holds “productive and valuable” (Merrill 2012, 2093). Yet always allowing 
property rights holders to uniquely capture all of the gains from the property they hold can also 
lead to growing inequality. As Merrill has described: 
 
[N]ot all gains in the value of resources are attributable to the skill and industry of the 
owner. Some will be due to rising market demand for resources generally; others will be 
due to sheer luck…The portion that can be attributed to luck or general conditions of 
scarcity represents a kind of built-in multiplier, whereby those that have property get 




Problematically, government efforts to address each of those negative and inequality-
exacerbating effects of property rights systems can be–and have been–successfully challenged 
under IIAs. Investors have used ISDS to, for example, secure compensation for environmental 
laws and decisions that seek to minimize or avoid environmental externalities;42 regulate tariffs 
or tackle anti-competitive pricing in provision of public services;43 or limit intellectual property 
rights, and assess “windfall profits taxes” seeking to capture a greater share of gains derived 
from the rising price of natural resources (i.e., gains not derived from the investor’s increased 
efficiency or skill).44 These types of decisions, which are based on a relatively singular focus on 
MNEs’ expectations, do not take into account the broader implications that such protections have 
for inequality. 
 
Some scholars have argued that property law can increase equity and inclusiveness if the notion 
of what is protected “property” were expanded, and a greater set of interests were folded within 
the definition of “property” rights (Super 2013). While that may be possible, the FET standard 
(coupled with the ISDS system) is a particularly non-inclusive approach, permitting only MNEs 
and their shareholders to expand and enforce their property rights (Van Harten and Malysheuski 
2016). Compounding the problem, IIAs correspondingly reduce the power of those who are 
excluded from or marginalized by status quo systems of property rights protections to improve 
their situation by “destabilizing” existing norms (Rosser 2015, 465 and Peñalver and Katyal 
2010, 1). When changing property rights systems would require government action that 
interferes with MNEs’ expectations, governments may lack the will and resources to risk IIA-
based retribution.    
Concluding Remarks 
 
As described above, IIAs provide MNEs privileged access to procedural remedies and strong 
substantive protections that favor MNEs’ property rights and expectations, creating and 
exacerbating inequality among a diverse group of other stakeholders. Furthermore, they allow 
MNEs to entrench the status quo, favoring incumbents and MNEs’ interests more generally. 
More analysis could usefully demonstrate how these two particular channels operate in theory 
and practice. To what extent do claims or threats of claims result in governments devoting their 
time, resources and policies to the interests and needs of MNEs within their borders? To what 
extent do MNEs engage in roundtripping to exploit these procedural and substantive benefits? To 
what extent do MNEs use the extra legal route provided by ISDS to insulate themselves from the 
effects of generally applicable domestic law, to prevent, stall, or reshape redistributive policies, 
or to modify outcomes in litigation between domestic parties? A number of known ISDS cases 
illustrates each of these practices and effects, but the extent of the trends has not been well-
                                                
42 See, e.g., Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, March 17, 2015. 
43 See, e.g., EDF v. Hungary, UNCITRAL, Award, December 4, 2014; Teco v. Guatemala, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/23, Award, December 19, 2013.  
44 See, e.g., Murphy Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award, February 
10, 2017; Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and 
Liability, June 30, 2011. 
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researched, in part because of the confidentiality of MNE-government interactions and in part of 
because of the challenge of isolating government motivations. 
 
Additional research could also interrogate other channels through which IIAs might impact intra-
national (and international) inequality. Relevant areas of inquiry could include research on the 
amount, destination, distribution, and effects of monetary compensation awarded under the 
treaties;45 the impact IIA rules limiting use of performance requirements or subsidies aimed at 
developing economic opportunities for socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals or 
communities; the ways in which IIA policies are developed at the domestic level and the 
influence that such policy input has on policy outputs and impacts; and the effects of IIA rules 
requiring that host governments accept and respond to MNE input on proposed and/or actual 
laws and regulations. Finally, further research could explore whether and how IIAs could be 
enlisted as a tool to combat intra-national inequality. As the system of international economic 
governance is expanding, and as intra-national inequality is increasing, it is crucial to understand 
the links between the two phenomena and how law can be used to advance, and not undermine, 
equality.
                                                
45 Research could build, for example, upon Gus Van Harten and Pavel Malysheuski, Who Has Benefitted 
Financially from Investment Treaty Arbitration? An Evaluation of the Size and Wealth of Claimants, 12 Osgoode 
Hall Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 14 (2016). Additional research could, for 
instance, trace the ultimate destination of compensation (e.g., to the firm itself, owners in the host country, owners in 
the home country, or owners in a tax haven).  
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